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Abstract
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the
characteristics of the players are unobservable to the analyst. We allow for a wide class of
distributions of unobserved heterogeneity, subject only to a separability assumption that
generalizes Choo and Siow (2006). We first show that the stable matching maximizes a social
gain function that trades off the average surplus due to the observable characteristics and a
generalized entropy term that reflects the impact of matching on unobserved characteristics.
We use this result to derive simple closed-form formulæ that identify the joint surplus in
every possible match and the equilibrium utilities of all participants, given any known
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. If transfers are observed, then the pre-transfer
utilities of both partners are also identified. We also present a very fast algorithm that
computes the optimal matching for any specification of the joint surplus. We conclude by
discussing some empirical approaches suggested by these results.
Keywords: matching, marriage, assignment, hedonic prices.
JEL codes: C78, D61, C13.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Becker (1973), economists have modeled the marriage
market as a matching problem in which each potential match generates a marital surplus.
Given transferable utilities, the distributions of tastes and of desirable characteristics de-
termine equilibrium shadow prices, which in turn explain how partners share the marital
surplus in any realized match. This insight is not specific of the marriage market: it char-
acterizes the “assignment game” (Shapley and Shubik 1972), i.e. models of matching with
transferable utilities. These models have also been applied to competitive equilibrium with
hedonic pricing (Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim 2010) and the market for CEOs (Tervio
(2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008).) We will show how our results can be used in these
three contexts; but for concreteness, we often refer to partners as men and women in the
exposition of the main results.
While Becker presented the general theory, he focused on the special case in which the
types of the partners are one-dimensional and are complementary in producing surplus.
As is well-known, the socially optimal matches then exhibit positive assortative matching :
higher types pair up with higher types, and lower types with lower types. Moreover, the
resulting configuration is stable, it is in the core of the corresponding matching game, and
it can be efficiently implemented by classical optimal assignment algorithms.
This sorting result is both simple and powerful; but its implications are also quite
unrealistic and at variance with the data, in which matches are observed between partners
with quite different characteristics. To account for this wider variety of matching patterns,
one could introduce search frictions, as in Shimer and Smith (2000) or Jacquemet and Robin
(2011). But the resulting model is hard to handle, and under some additional conditions
it still implies assortative matching. An alternative solution consists in allowing the joint
surplus of a match to incorporate latent characteristics—heterogeneity that is unobserved
by the analyst. Choo and Siow (2006) showed that it can be done in a way that yields a
highly tractable model in large populations, provided that the unobserved heterogeneities
enter the marital surplus quasi-additively and that they are distributed as standard type I
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extreme value terms. Then the usual apparatus of multinomial logit discrete choice models
applies, linking marriage patterns to marital surplus in a very simple manner. Choo and
Siow (2006) used this model to link the changes in gains to marriage and abortion laws;
Siow and Choo (2006) applied it to Canadian data to measure the impact of demographic
changes. It has also been used to study increasing returns in marriage markets (Botticini
and Siow 2008) and to test for complementarities across partner educations (Siow 2009);
and, in a heteroskedastic version, to estimate the changes in the returns to education on
the US marriage market (Chiappori, Salanie´, and Weiss 2012).
We revisit here the theory of matching with transferable utilities in the light of Choo and
Siow’s insights; and we extend this framework to quite general distributions of unobserved
variations in tastes. Our main contributions are twofold. First, we prove that the optimal
matching maximizes a very simple function of the observable only. With quasi-additive
surplus, the market equilibrium maximizes a social surplus function that consists of two
terms: a term that describes assortativeness on the observed characteristics; and a general-
ized entropic term that describes the random character of matching conditional on observed
characteristics. While the first term tends to match partners with complementary observed
characteristics, the second one pulls towards randomly assigning partners to each other.
The social gain from any matching patterns trades off these two terms. In particular, when
unobserved heterogeneity is distributed as in Choo and Siow (2006), the generalized entropy
is simply the usual entropy measure. The maximization of this social surplus function has
very straightforward consequences in terms of identification, both when equilibrium trans-
fers are observed and when they are not. In fact, most quantities of interest can be obtained
from derivatives of the terms that constitute generalized entropy. We show in particular
that the joint surplus from matching is (minus) a derivative of the generalized entropy,
computed at the observed matching. The expected and realized utilities of all types of men
and women follow just as directly. If moreover equilibrium transfers are observed, then we
also identify the pre-transfer utilities on both sides of the market. To prove these results,
we combine tools from duality and convexity theory, and we construct the Legendre-Fenchel
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transform of the expected utilities of agents. A similar approach was used independently
by Decker, Lieb, McCann, and Stephens (2012) to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium
and derive some of its properties in the Choo and Siow framework.
Our second contribution is to delineate an empirical approach to parametric estimation
in this class of models, using maximum likelihood. Indeed, our nonparametric identification
results rely on the strong assumption that the distribution of the unobservables is known,
while in practice the analyst will want to estimate its parameters. The large number of
covariates available to model the surplus function also limits the scope of nonparametric
estimation. Maximum likelihood estimation is thus a natural recourse; but since evaluating
the likelihood requires solving for the optimal matching, computational considerations loom
large in matching models. We provide an efficient algorithm that maximizes the social
surplus for any joint surplus function and computes the optimal matching, as well as the
expected utilities in equilibrium. To do this, we adapt the Iterative Projection Fitting
Procedure (known to some economists as RAS) to the structure of this problem. IPFP
is a very stable and very simple algorithm; we report simulations that show that is much
faster than alternative solvers. Finally, we show that in the context of the Choo and Siow
(2006) model the maximum likelihood is a simple moment matching estimator, and we give
a geometric interpretation.
There are other approaches to estimating matching models with unobserved hetero-
geneity; see the handbook chapter by Graham (2011). Fox (2010) in particular exploits
a “rank-order property” and pools data across many similar markets; see Fox (2011) and
Bajari and Fox (2009) for applications. More recently, Fox and Yang (2012) focus on iden-
tifying the complementarity between unobservable characteristics. We discuss the pros and
cons of various methods in our conclusion.
Section 1 sets up the model and the notation. We prove our main results in Section 2,
and we specialize them to leading examples in Section 3. Our results open the way to
new and richer specifications; Section 4 explains how to estimate them using maximum
likelihood, and how to use various restrictions to identify the underlying parameters. We
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present in Section 5 our IPFP algorithm, which greatly accelerates computations. Finally,
Section 6 specializes our results to a restricted but useful model1.
1 The Assignment Problem with Unobserved Heterogeneity
1.1 The Populations
Throughout the paper, we maintain the basic assumptions of the transferable utility model
of Choo and Siow (2006): utility transfers between partners are unconstrained, matching
is frictionless, and there is no asymmetric information among potential partners. We call
the partners “men” and “women”, but our results are clearly not restricted to the marriage
market.
Men are denoted by i ∈ I and women by j ∈ J . A matching (µ˜ij) is a matrix such that
µ˜ij = 1 if man i and woman j are matched, 0 otherwise. A matching is feasible if for every
i and j, ∑
k∈J
µ˜ik ≤ 1 and
∑
k∈I
µ˜kj ≤ 1,
with equality for individuals who are married. Single individuals are “matched with 0”:
µ˜i0 = 1 or µ˜0j = 1. For completeness, we should add the requirement that µ˜ij is integral
(µ˜ij ∈ {0, 1}). However it is known since at least Shapley and Shubik (1972) that this
constraint is not binding, so we will omit it.
A hypothetical match between man i and woman j allows them to share a total utility
Φ˜ij ; the division of this total utility between them is done through utility transfers whose
value is determined in equilibrium. Singles get utilities Φ˜i0, Φ˜0j . Following Gale and Shapley
(1962) for matching with non-transferable utility, we focus on the set of stable matchings.
A feasible matching is stable if there exists a division of the surplus in each realized match
that makes it impossible for any man k and woman l to both achieve strictly higher utility
by pairing up together, and for any agent to achieve higher utility by being single. More
1This paper builds on and significantly extends our earlier discussion paper (Galichon and Salanie´ 2010),
which is now obsolete.
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formally, let u˜i denote the utility man i gets in his current match; denote v˜j the correspond-
ing utilities for woman j. Then by definition u˜i + v˜j = Φ˜ij if they are matched, that is if
µ˜ij > 0; and u˜i = Φ˜i0 (resp. v˜j = Φ˜0j) if i (resp. j) is single. Stability requires that for
every man k and woman l, u˜k ≥ Φ˜k0 and v˜l ≥ Φ˜0l, and u˜k + v˜l ≥ Φ˜kl for any potential
match (k, l).
Finally, a competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of prices u˜i and v˜j and a feasible
matching µ˜ij such that
µ˜ij > 0 iff j ∈ arg max
j∈J∪{0}
(
Φ˜ij − v˜j
)
and i ∈ arg max
i∈I∪{0}
(
Φ˜ij − u˜i
)
. (1.1)
Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the set of stable matchings coincides with the set
of competitive equilibria (and with the core of the assignment game); and that moreover,
any stable matching achieves the maximum of the total surplus2∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
ν˜ijΦ˜ij +
∑
i∈I
ν˜i0Φ˜i0 +
∑
j∈J
ν˜0jΦ˜0j
over all feasible matchings ν˜.
The set of stable matchings is generically a singleton; on the other hand, the set of prices
u˜i and v˜j (or, equivalently, the division of the surplus into u˜i and v˜j) that support it is a
product of intervals.
1.2 Groups
The analyst only observes some of the payoff-relevant characteristics that determine the
surplus matrix Φ˜. Following Choo and Siow (2006), we assume that she can only observe
which group each individual belongs to. Each man i ∈ I belongs to one group xi ∈ X ;
and, similarly, each woman j ∈ J belongs to one group yj ∈ Y. Groups are defined by the
intersection of characteristics which are observed by all men and women, and also by the
analyst. On the other hand, men and women of a given group differ along some dimensions
that they all observe, but which do not figure in the analyst’s dataset.
2See also Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1992) for the extension to a continuum of agents.
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As an example, observed groups x, y = (E,R) may consist of education and income.
Education could take values E ∈ {D,G} (dropout or graduate), and income class R could
take values 1 to nR. Groups may also incorporate information that is sometimes available
to the econometrician, such as physical characteristics, religion, and so on. In this paper
we take the numbers of groups |X | and |Y| to be finite in number; we return to the case of
continuous groups in the conclusion.
We denote nx the number of men in group x, and my the number of women in group
y. Like Choo and Siow, we assume that there are a large number of men in any group x,
and of women in any group y. More precisely, our statements in the following hold exactly
when the number of individuals goes to infinity and the proportions of genders and groups
converge. To simplify the exposition, we consider the limit of a sequence of large economies
where the proportion of each group remains constant:
Assumption 1 (Large Market) The number of individuals on the market
N =
∑
x∈X
nx +
∑
y∈Y
my
goes to infinity; and the ratios (nx/N) and (my/N) are constant.
With finite N we would need to introduce corrective terms; however, since N is the size
of the total population rather than that of the sample we use for estimation, these terms
can safely be neglected in applications to the marriage market for instance.
Another benefit of Assumption 1 is that it mitigates concerns about agents misrepresent-
ing their characteristics. This is almost always a profitable deviation in finite populations;
but as shown by Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999), the benefit from such manipulations
goes to zero as the population is replicated. In the large markets limit, the equilibrium
prices u˜i and v˜j are unique. We will therefore write “the equilibrium” in what follows.
The analyst does not observe some of the characteristics of the players, and she can only
compute quantities that depend on the observed groups of the partners in a match. Hence
she cannot observe µ˜, and she must focus instead on the matrix of matches across groups
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(µxy). This is related to (µ˜ij) by
µxy =
∑
i,j
1 (xi = x, yj = y) µ˜ij
with the obvious extension to µx0 and µ0y.
The feasibility constraints on µxy ≥ 0 are
∀x ∈ X ,
∑
y∈Y
µxy ≤ nx ; ∀y ∈ Y,
∑
x∈X
µxy ≤ my (1.2)
which simply means that the number of married men (women) of group x (y) is not greater
than the number of men (women) of group x (y). For future reference, we denoteM the set
of (|X | |Y|+ |X |+ |Y|) non-negative numbers (µxy) that satisfy these (|X |+ |Y|) equalities.
Each element ofM is called a “matching” as it defines a feasible set of matches (and singles).
For notational convenience, we shall denote µx0 the number of single men of group x and
µ0y the number of single women of group y, and X0 = X ∪ {0} and Y0 = Y ∪ {0} the set of
marital choices that are available to agents, including singlehood. Obviously,
µx0 = nx −
∑
y∈Y
µxy and µ0y = my −
∑
x∈X
µxy.
1.3 Matching Surpluses
Several approaches can be used to take this model to the data. A “brute force” method
would use a parametric specification for the surplus Φ˜mw and solve the system of equilibrium
equations (1.1). The set of maximizers at the solution of this system defines the stable
matchings, and can be compared to the observed matching in order to derive a minimum
distance estimator of the parameters. However, there are two problems with this approach:
it is very costly, and it is not clear at all what drives identification of the parameters. The
literature has instead attempted to impose identifying assumptions that allow for more
transparent identification. We follow here the framework of Choo and Siow (2006). We will
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discuss other approaches in the conclusion, including those of Fox (2010) and Fox and Yang
(2012).
Choo and Siow assumed that the utility surplus of a man i of group x (that is, such
that xi = x) who marries a woman of group y can be written as
αxy + τ + εiy, (1.3)
where αxy is the systematic part of the surplus τ represents the utility transfer (possibly
negative) that the man gets from his partner in equilibrium, and εiy is a standard type I
extreme value random variation. If such a man remains single, he gets utility εi0; that is to
say, the systematic utilities of singles αx0 are normalized to zero. Similarly, the utility of a
woman j of group yj = y who marries a man of group x can be written as
γxy − τ + ηxj , (1.4)
where τ is the utility transfer she leaves to her partner. A woman of group y gets utility
η0j if she is single, that is we adopt normalization γ0y = 0.
As shown in Chiappori, Salanie´, and Weiss (2012), the key assumption here is that the
joint surplus created when a man i of group x marries a woman j of group y rule out
interactions between their unobserved characteristics, conditional on (x, y). This leads us
to assume:
Assumption 2 (Separability) There exists a vector Φxy such that the joint surplus from
a match between a man i in group x and a woman j in group j is
Φ˜ij = Φxy + εiy + ηxj .
In Choo and Siow’s formulation, the vector Φ is simply
Φxy = αxy + γxy,
which they call the total systematic net gains to marriage; and note that by construction,
Φx0 and Φ0y are zero. It is easy to see that Assumption 2 is equivalent to specifying that if
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two men i and i′ belong to the same group x, and their respective partners j and j′ belong
to the same group y, then the total surplus generated by these two matches is unchanged if
we shuﬄe partners: Φ˜ij+Φ˜i′j′ = Φ˜ij′+Φ˜i′j . Note that in this form it is clear that we needn’t
adopt Choo and Siow’s original interpretation of ε as a preference shock of the husband and
η as a preference shock of the wife. To take an extreme example, we could equally have men
who are indifferent over partners and are only interested in the transfer they receive, so that
their ex post utility is τ ; and women who also care about some attractiveness characteristic
of men, in a way that may depend on the woman’s group. The net utility of women of
group y would be εiy − τ ; the resulting joint surplus would satisfy Assumption 2 and all of
our results would apply3. In other words, there is no need to assume that the term εiyj was
“created” by man i, nor that the term ηjxi was “created” by the woman j; it may perfectly
be the opposite.
1.4 Choo and Siow’s Identification Result
In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, Choo and Siow (2006) specified the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneities to be independent products of standard type I extreme values
distributions:
Assumption 3 (Type-I extreme values distribution)
a) For any man i, the (εiy)y∈Y0 are drawn independently from a standard type I extreme
value distribution;
b) For any woman j, the (ηxj)x∈X0 are drawn independently from a standard type I
extreme value distribution;
c) These draws are independent across men and women.
3It is easy to see that in such a model, a man i who is married in equilibrium is matched with a woman
in the group that values his attractiveness most, and he receives a transfer τ i = maxy∈Y εiy.
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Choo and Siow proved that under Assumptions 1-3, there is a simple equilibrium re-
lationship between group preferences, as defined by α and γ, and equilibrium marriage
patterns. To state their result, we denote µxy the number of marriages between men of
group x and women of group y; µx0 the number of single men of group x; and µ0y the
number of single women of group y. Then:
Theorem 1 (Choo and Siow) Under Assumptions 1-3, in equilibrium, for all x, y ≥ 1
exp
(
Φxy
2
)
=
µxy√
µx0µ0y
.
Therefore marriage patterns µ directly identify the gains to marriage Φ.
1.5 Unobserved Heterogeneity
One of our goals in this paper is to extend identification to quite general distributions
of unobserved heterogeneity. We continue to assume separability (Assumption 2) and a
large market (Assumption 1); but we allow for quite general distributions of unobserved
heterogeneity:
Assumption 4 (Distribution of Unobserved Variation in Surplus)
a) For any man i such that xi = x, the εiy are drawn from a (|Y| + 1)-dimensional
centered distribution Px;
b) For any woman j such that yj = y, the ηxj are drawn from an (|X |+ 1)-dimensional
centered distribution Qy;
c) These draws are independent across men and women.
Assumption 4 clearly is a substantial generalization with respect to Choo and Siow
(2006). It relaxes Assumption 3 in three important ways: it allows for different families
of distributions, with any form of heteroskedasticity, and with any pattern of correlation
across partner groups.
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2 Social Surplus, Utilities, and Identification
We derive most of our results by considering the “primal” problem, which maximizes the
total joint surplus. As Choo and Siow (2006) remind us (p. 177): “A well-known property of
transferable utility models of the marriage market is that they maximize the sum of marital
output in the society”. This is true when marital output is defined as it is evaluated by the
participants: the market equilibrium in fact maximizes
∑
i,j µ˜ijΦ˜ij over the set of feasible
matchings (µ˜ij). A very naive evaluation of the sum of marital output, computed from the
groups of partners only, would be ∑
xy
µxyΦxy, (2.1)
but this is clearly misleading. Realized matches by nature have a value of the unobserved
marital surplus (εiy + ηxj) that is more favorable than an unconditional draw; and as a
consequence, the equilibrium marriage patterns (µ) do not maximize
∑
xy µxyΦxy over M.
In order to find the expression of the value function that (µ) maximizes, we need to account
for terms that reflect the conditional expectation of the unobserved parts of the surplus,
given a match on observable groups.
2.1 Separability and Discrete Choice
We first prove that separability (Assumption 2) reduces the choice of partner to a one-sided
discrete choice problem. To see this, note that by standard results in the literature (Shapley
and Shubik 1972), the equilibrium utilities solve the system of functional equations
u˜i = max
j
(
Φ˜ij − v˜j
)
and v˜j = max
i
(
Φ˜ij − u˜i
)
,
where the maximization includes the option of singlehood.
Focus on the first one. It states that the utility man i gets in equilibrium trades off the
surplus his match with woman j creates and the share of the joint surplus he has to give
her, which is given by her own equilibrium utility. There may be several pairs of vectors
(u, v) that solve this system; and for each of them, any feasible matching whose support is
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contained in the set of maximizers is an optimal matching. Now use Assumption 2: for a
man i in group x,
Φ˜ij = Φxyj + εiyj + ηxj
so that
u˜i = max
j
(
Φ˜ij − v˜j
)
= max
y
max
j|yj=y
(
Φ˜ij − v˜j
)
can be rewritten as
u˜i = max
y
(
Φxy + εiy − min
j|yj=y
(
v˜j − ηxj
))
.
Denoting
Vxy = min
j|yj=y
(
v˜j − ηxj
)
and Uxy = Φxy − Vxy, it follows that:
Proposition 1 (Splitting the Surplus)
There exist two vectors Uxy and Vxy such that Φxy = Uxy + Vxy and in equilibrium:
(i) Man i in group x achieves utility
u˜i = max
y∈Y0
(Uxy + εiy)
and he matches with some woman whose group y achieves the maximum;
(ii) Woman j in group y achieves utility
v˜j = max
x∈X0
(
Vxy + ηxj
)
and she matches with some man whose group x achieves the maximum.
This result also appears in Chiappori, Salanie´, and Weiss (2012), with a different proof.
It reduces the two-sided matching problem to a series of one-sided discrete choice problems
that are only linked through the adding-up formula Uxy +Vxy = Φxy. Men of a given group
x match women of different groups, since they have idiosyncratic εiy shocks. But as a
consequence of the separability assumption, if a man of group x matches with a woman of
group y, then he would be equally well-off with any other woman of this group. The vectors
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Uxy and Vxy depend on all of the primitives of the model (the vector Φxy, the distributions
of the utility shocks ε and η, and the number of groups n and m.) They are only a useful
construct, and they should not be interpreted as utilities. As we will see in Section 2.3,
there are at least three relevant definitions of utility, and U and V do not measure any of
them.
2.2 Social surplus
In the following, for any (Axy) we denote Ax· = (Ax0, Ax1, . . . , Ax|Y|) and A·y = (A0y, A1y, . . . , A|X |y).
Consider a randomly chosen man in group x. His expected utility (conditional to belonging
to this group) is
Gx(Ux·) = EPx
(
max
y∈Y0
(Uxy + εy)
)
,
where the expectation is taken over the random vector (ε0, . . . , ε|Y|) ∼ Px. Similarly, a
randomly chosen woman of group y expects to get utility
Hy(V·y) = EQy
(
max
x∈X0
(Vxy + ηx)
)
.
The social surplus is simply the sum of the expected utilities of all groups of men and
women: ∑
x∈X
nxGx(Ux·) +
∑
y∈Y
myHy(V·y).
Of course the vectors U and V are unobserved; we must find a way to write them in terms
of the matching patterns µ.
For simplicity, we will focus on the case when all groups of matches are possible at the
optimal matching: for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, µxy is positive. A simple way to guarantee
this is to assume
Assumption 5 (Full support) The distributions Px and Qy all have full support.
Assumption 5 can be relaxed in the obvious way: all that matters is that the supports
of the distributions are wide enough relative to the variation in Φ.
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We first give a heuristic derivation4 of our main result, Theorem 2 below. Focusing on
the function Gx, first note that for any two numbers a, b and random variables (ε, η), the
derivative of Emax(a + ε, b + η) with respect to a is simply the probability that a + ε is
larger than b+ η. Applying this to the function Gx, we get
∂Gx
∂Uxy
(Ux·) = Pr(Uxy + εiy ≥ Uxz + εiz for all z ∈ Y0).
But the right-hand side is simply the probability that a man of group x partners with a
woman of group y; and therefore
∂Gx
∂Uxy
(Ux·) =
µxy
nx
. (2.2)
As the expectation of the maximum of linear functions of the (Uxy), Gx is a convex function
of Ux·. Now consider the function
G∗x(µx·) = max
U˜x·=(U˜x0,...,U˜x|Y|)
∑
y∈Y0
µxyU˜xy −
∑
y∈Y0
µxy
Gx(U˜x.)
 (2.3)
whenever
∑
y∈Y0 µxy = nx, G
∗
x(µx·) = +∞ otherwise. This is just the Legendre-Fenchel
transform of Gx rescaled by the factor
∑
y∈Y0 µxy. Like Gx and for the same reasons, it is
a convex function. By the envelope theorem, at the optimum in the definition of G∗x
∂G∗x
∂µxy
(µx·) = Uxy −Gx(Ux·) (2.4)
∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·) = −Gx(Ux·) (2.5)
where the second equality comes from the fact that we have normalized Ux0 at zero. As a
consequence, for any y ∈ Y
Uxy =
∂G∗x
∂µxy
(µx·)−
∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·)
is identified from µx·, the observed matching patterns of men of group x. Going back to
(2.3), convex duality implies that
nxGx(Ux·) =
∑
y∈Y0
µxy
Gx(Ux·) = ∑
y∈Y0
µxyUxy −G∗x(µx·). (2.6)
4Appendix A gives rigorous proofs of all of our results.
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Defining H∗y (µ·y) similarly for women of group y and using Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, we get the
value of the total surplus:
∑
x∈X
nxGx(Ux·) +
∑
y∈Y
myHy(V·y) =
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy −
∑
x∈X
G∗x(µx·)−
∑
y∈Y
H∗y (µ·y).
This can readily be computed from the data: it only requires specifying the distributions
Px and Qy and observing the margins n and m and the matching patterns µ. Finally,
the expected equilibrium utility of the average man in group x is Gx(Ux·), which equals
− ∂G∗x∂µx0 (µx·) by (2.5). Once again this is easy to compute from the data, given a specification
of the error distributions.
Let us now turn to a formal statement of the main welfare and identification result,
which is proved in Appendix A. Note that since the functions G∗x and H∗y are convex,
they are differentiable almost everywhere—and very mild assumptions on the distributions
Px and Qy would make them differentiable everywhere. We will use their derivatives in
stating our results; they should be replaced with subgradients at hypothetical points of
non-differentiability.
Theorem 2 (Social Surplus and identification)
(i) Under assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5, the optimal matching µ maximizes the social gain
W(µ) =
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy + E(µ) (2.7)
over all feasible matchings, where E is defined by
E(µ) = −
∑
x∈X
G∗x (µx·)−
∑
y∈Y
H∗y
(
µ·y
)
.
In equilibrium, for any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y
Φxy =
∂E
∂µx0
(µ)− ∂E
∂µ0y
(µ)− ∂E
∂µxy
(µ), (2.8)
15
that is
Φxy =
∂G∗x
∂µxy
(µx·) +
∂H∗y
∂µxy
(
µ·y
)− ∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·)−
∂H∗y
∂µ0y
(
µ·y
)
.
ii) A man i of group x who marries a woman of group y obtains utility
Uxy + εiy = max
z∈Y0
(Uxz + εiz)
where
Uxz =
∂G∗x
∂µxz
(µx·)−
∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·)
can also be computed by solving the system of equations
∂Gx
∂Uxz
(Ux·) =
µxz
nx
for z ∈ Y0
given the normalization Ux0 = 0.
iii) The average expected utility of the men of group x is
ux = Gx(Ux·) = − ∂G
∗
x
∂µx0
(µx·). (2.9)
(iv) Parts (ii) and (iii) transpose to women with the obvious changes.
(v) Denote the systematic parts of pre-transfer utilities (α, γ) and of transfers τ as in
Section 1. Then
Uxy = αxy + τxy and Vxy = γxy − τxy.
Therefore if transfers are observed, both pre-transfer utilities αxy and γxy are also identified.
In fact, the functions G∗x and H∗y can also be evaluated by solving an associated matching
problem. Take men of group x for instance. Denote µY |X=x the probability distribution
giving mass µxy/
(∑
y′∈Y0 µxy′
)
to option y ∈ Y0. Define Mx as the set of probability
distributions of the random joint vector (εi·, Y ), where:
• εi· = (εiy)y∈Y0 a random vector taking values in R|Y0| such that εi· ∼ Px
• Y is a random variable taking values in Y0 such that Y ∼ µY |X=x.
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Then:
Proposition 2 The function G∗x is (−nx) times the value of matching optimally the distri-
bution Px of random vector εi· and the distribution µY |X=x when the surplus from a match
is the unobserved heterogeneity (εi·,y)→ εiy :
G∗x(µx·) = −nx max
pi∈Mx
Epi [εiY ] if
∑
y∈Y0
µxy = nx
= +∞ else.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a result, all of the quantities in Theorem 2 can be computed by solving simple linear
programming problems.
2.3 Discussion
The right-hand side of equation (2.7) gives the value of the social surplus when the matching
patterns are (µxy). The first term
∑
xy µxyΦxy reflects “group preferences”: if groups x
and y generate more surplus when matched, then they should be matched with higher
probability. On the other hand, the second and the third term reflect the effect of the
dispersion of individual affinities, conditional on observed characteristics: those men i in
a group x that have more affinity to women of group y should be matched to this group
with a higher probability. In the one-dimensional Beckerian example, a higher x or y could
reflect higher education. If the marital surplus is complementary in the educations of the
two partners, Φxy is supermodular and the first term is maximized when matching partners
with similar education levels (as far as feasibility constraints allow.) But because of the
dispersion of marital surplus that comes from the ε and η terms, it will be optimal to have
some marriages between dissimilar partners.
To interpret the formula, start with the case when unobserved heterogeneity is dwarfed
by variation due to observable characteristics: Φ˜ij ' Φxy if xi = x and yj = y. Then we
know that the observed matching µ must maximize the value in (2.1); but this is precisely
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what the more complicated expressionW(µ) above boils down to if we scale up the values of
Φ to infinity. If on the other hand data is so poor that unobserved heterogeneity dominates
(Φ ' 0), then the analyst should observe something that, to her, looks like completely
random matching. Information theory tells us that entropy is a natural measure of statistical
disorder; and as we will see in Example 1, in the simple case analyzed by Choo and Siow
(2006) the function E is just the usual notion of entropy. For this reason, we call it the
generalized entropy of the matching.
In the intermediate case in which some of the variation in marital surplus is driven by
group characteristics (through the Φxy) and some is carried by the unobserved heterogeneity
terms εiy and ηxj , the market equilibrium trades off matching on group characteristics (as in
(2.1)) and matching on unobserved characteristics, as measured by the generalized entropy
terms in E(µ).
The data directly yield the numbers of participants of each group nx and my and their
matching patterns µ; and the specification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
determines the functions G∗x and H∗y . Part (i) of the result shows that the social surplus
can be identified by computing these functions. As we show in section 3, this can be done
in closed form in many usual cases. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2 show that participant
utilities are also identified and easily computed. Note that there are three measures of
utilities:
• ex ante utility ux is the expected utility of a man, conditional on his being in group
x. Part (iii) gives a very simple formula to compute it;
• ex interim utility, if we also condition on this man marrying a woman of group y, is
E [Uxy + εiy|Uxy + εiy ≥ Uxz + εiz for all z ∈ Y] ;
this can be computed since the Uxz’s are identified from part (ii), although it may
require simulation for general distributions;
• ex post utility Uxy + εiy for these men, whose distribution can also be simulated.
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In the special case studied by Choo and Siow, ex post utility is distributed as type I
extreme value with mean (− log µx0nx ), which is the common value ux of ex ante and ex
interim utility; but the three definitions give different results in general (de Palma and
Kilani 2007).
3 Examples
While Proposition 2 provides a general way of computing surplus and utilities, they can
often be derived in closed form. Appendix B gives the resulting formulæ for McFadden’s
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) framework. This comprises most specifications used in
discrete choice studies. The first one is, obviously, Choo and Siow’s model. This obtains
when the Px and Qy distributions are all standard type I extreme value and i.i.d.:
Example 1 (Choo and Siow) Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3 (which implies 5), for fea-
sible matchings the function E is simply (see Appendix C.1 for details)
E(µ) = −
∑
x∈X
y∈Y0
µxy log
µxy
nx
−
∑
x∈X 0
y∈Y
µxy log
µxy
my
,
so that
W(µ) =
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy −
∑
x∈X
y∈Y0
µxy log
µxy
nx
−
∑
x∈X 0
y∈Y
µxy log
µxy
my
. (3.1)
Moreover, surplus and matching patterns are linked by
Φxy = 2 log µxy − logµx0 − logµ0y, (3.2)
which is Choo and Siow’s result (Theorem 1 above.)
Note that as announced after Theorem 2, the generalized entropy E boils down here to
the usual definition of entropy. As a more complex example of a GEV distribution, consider
a nested logit.
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Example 2 (A two-level nested logit) Suppose for instance that men of group x are
concerned about the social group of their partner and her education. There are G social
groups and there are L levels of education, so that a group x = (g, e). We can allow for
correlated preferences by modeling this as a nested logit in which educations are nested within
social groups. Consider men of group x; let σx,g′ measure the dispersion in the surplus they
generate with partners of different education levels within social group g′. We show in
Appendix C.2 that
Ux,g′e′ = log
µx,g′
µx,0
+ σx,g′ log
µx,g′e′
µx,g′
;
so that the social surplus is identified as
Φge,g′e′ = log
µge,g′µg,g′e′
µge,0µ0,g′e′
+ σge,g′ log
µge,g′e′
µge,g′
+ σg,g′e′ log
µge,g′e′
µg,g′e′
.
While the GEV framework is convenient, is is common in the applied literature to allow,
say, for random variation in preferences over characteristics of products. Our last example
incorporates this idea. We develop the computations in Appendix C.3 on a slightly more
general case.
Example 3 (A “mixed” model) Assume that for man i in group x, εiy = εiφx(y), where
φx (y) is an index of the observable characteristics of women that is common to all men in
the same group. The random term εi, which we take to be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]
for simplicity, denotes unobserved variation in how men in group x “weigh” this index.
For y ∈ Y0, denote
FY |x(y) = Pr (φ(Y ) ≤ φ(y)|X = x) , (3.3)
where Y has the distribution µY |X=x, which is observed in the data. We show in Ap-
pendix C.3 that
G∗x(µx·) = −
∑
y∈Y0
φx (y)
(
FY |x (y)−
µxy
2nx
)
µxy,
and that the expected utility of men of group x is
ux = E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (0))] ,
20
while the first term of the surplus of men of group x matching with women of group y is
Uxy = −E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (y))] + E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (0))] .
4 Parametric Inference
Theorem 2 shows that, given a specification of the distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneities Px and Qy, the model spelled out by assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5 is exactly
nonparametrically identified from the observation of a single market, as long as µxy, µx0
and µy0 > 0 for each x and y. In particular, one recovers the fact that the model of Choo
and Siow is identified from the observation of a single market. There is therefore no way to
test separability from the observation of a single market. When multiple, but similar mar-
kets (in the sense that Φxy, Px and Qy are identical across them) are observed, the model
is nonparametrically overidentified given a fixed specification of Px and Qy. The flexibility
allowed by Assumption 4 can then be used to infer information about these distributions.
In the present paper, we are assuming that a single market is being observed. While
the formula in Theorem 2(i) gives a straightforward nonparametric estimator of the sys-
tematic surplus function Φ, with multiple surplus-relevant observable groups it will be very
unreliable. Even our toy education/income example of Section 1 already has 4n2R cells; and
realistic applications will require many more. In addition, we do not know the distributions
Px and Qy. Both of these remarks point towards the need to specify a parametric model in
most applications. Such a model would be described by a family of joint surplus functions
and distributions
Φλxy, P
λ
x, Q
λ
y
for λ in some subset of a finite-dimensional parameter space Λ.
We observe a sample of Nˆind individuals; Nind =
∑
x nˆx +
∑
y mˆy, where nˆx (resp. mˆy)
denotes the number of men of group x (resp. women of group y) in the sample. Let µˆ the
observed matching; we assume that the data was generated by the parametric model above,
with an interior parameter vector λ0.
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Recall the expression of the social surplus:
W
(
Φλ
)
= max
µ∈M(nˆ,mˆ)
(∑
x,y
µxyΦ
λ
xy + Eλ (µ)
)
Let µλ be the optimal matching. We will show in Section 5 how it can be computed
very efficiently. For now we focus on statistical inference on λ. We will use Conditional
Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation, where we condition on the observed margins nˆx
and mˆy. The log-likelihood of marital choice is∑
y∈Y0
µˆxy
nˆx
log
µλxy
nˆx
for each man of group x
and a similar expression for each woman of group y. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5,
the choice of each individual is stochastic in that it depends on his vector of unobserved
heterogeneity, and these vectors are independent across men and women. Hence the log-
likelihood of the sample is the sum of the individual log-likelihood elements:
logL (λ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y0
µˆxy log
µλxy
nˆx
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X0
µˆxy log
µλxy
mˆy
= 2
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µˆxy log
µλxy√
nˆxmˆy
+
∑
x∈X
µˆx0 log
µλx0
nˆx
+
∑
y∈Y
µˆ0y log
µλ0y
mˆy
.
The Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator λˆ given by
∂ logL
∂λ
(
λˆ
)
= 0
is consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient under the usual set of
assumptions. As we will see in Section 6, it becomes a very simple Moment Matching
estimator in a special but useful class of models.
5 Computation
Maximizing the conditional likelihood requires computing the optimal matching µλ for a
large number of values of λ. But the optimal matching will be a large-dimensional object
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in realistic applications; and it is itself the maximizer of W in (2.7). It is therefore crucial
to be able to compute µλ efficiently. We show here how the Iterative Proportional Fitting
Procedure (IPFP) provides a solution to this problem.
Take the Choo and Siow (2006) model of Example 1 for instance. Fix a value of λ and
dropping it from the notation: let the joint surplus function be Φ, with optimal matching
µ. Formula (3.2) can be rewritten as
µxy = exp
(
Φxy
2
)√
µx0µ0y. (5.1)
In principle we could just plug this into the feasibility constraints
∑
y µxy + µx0 = nˆx and∑
x µxy + µ0y = mˆy and solve for the numbers of singles µx0 and µ0y. Unfortunately, the
resulting equations are still high-dimensional and highly nonlinear, which makes them hard
to handle. Even proving the uniqueness of the solution to this system of equations is a hard
problem. This is done in Decker, Lieb, McCann, and Stephens (2012), who also derive some
comparative statics results on the variation of µ with Φ, mˆ and nˆ.
On the other hand, to find a feasible solution of (3.2), we could start from an infeasible
solution and project it somehow on the set of feasible matchingsM(nˆ, mˆ). Moreover, IPFP
was precisely designed to find projections on intersecting sets of constraints, by projecting
iteratively on each constraint. It is used for instance as the RAS method to impute missing
values in data.
Now if we start from any infeasible solution to (3.2) and we use for instance the Euclidean
distance to project on the feasible matchings, we would be very lucky to end up at the
optimal matching. To get the algorithm there we will need to carefully choose both the
infeasible solution and the projection distance. As it turns out, we can do it in the general
case studied in this paper. We can formally describe the algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 1
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1. Set k = 0, and take any µ(0) that solves (2.8):
Φλxy =
∂Eλ
∂µx0
(µ(0)) +
∂Eλ
∂µ0y
(µ(0))− ∂E
λ
∂µxy
(µ(0))
and that has the same total number of individuals as in the sample:
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
µ(0)xy +
∑
x∈X
µ
(0)
x0 +
∑
y∈Y
µ
(0)
0y = Nind
where Nind =
∑
x nˆx +
∑
y mˆy is the number of individuals in the sample.
2. Compute µ(2k+1) by
∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k+1)) =
∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k))− ax for y ∈ Y and ∂E
∂µ0y
(µ(2k+1)) =
∂E
∂µ0y
(µ(2k))
where (ax) is such that
∑
y∈Y0 µ
(2k+1)
xy = nˆx for every x ∈ X .
3. Compute µ(2k+2) by
∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k+2)) =
∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k+1))− by for x ∈ X and ∂E
∂µx0
(µ(2k+1)) =
∂E
∂µx0
(µ(2k))
where (by) is such that
∑
x∈X0 µ
(2k+2)
xy = mˆy for every y ∈ Y.
4. If µ(2k+2) is close enough to µ(2k), then go to step 5; otherwise add one to k and go
to step 2.
5. Take µλ = µ(2k+2) to be the optimal matching.
We prove in Appendix A that
Theorem 3 The algorithm converges to the solution µ of (2.7).
To illustrate, take the Choo and Siow example again. Choose a constant C, define µ(0)
by µ
(0)
x0 = µ
(0)
0y = C for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and apply (5.1) to get µ(0)xy . By construction
µ(0) solves (2.8), and since it is proportional to C we can choose C so as to have the same
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number of individuals as in the sample. Then µ(0) is suitable for step 1. The updating step
3 gives for x, y 6= 0
µ(2k+1)xy = µ
(2k)
xy exp
(ax
2
)
and µ
(2k+1)
x0 = µ
(2k)
x0 exp (ax) ,
along with µ
(2k+1)
0y = µ
(2k)
0y ; so that we need to solve in ax the equation∑
y
µ(2k)xy exp
(ax
2
)
+ µ
(2k)
x0 exp (ax) = nˆx.
This is a quadratic equation in only one unknown, exp(ax/2); as such it can be solved in
closed form.
The convergence is extremely fast. We tested it on a simulation in which we let the
number of categories |X | = |Y| increase from 100 to 1,000. For each of these ten cases, we
draw 50 samples, with the nx and my drawn uniformly in {1, . . . , 100}; and for each (x, y)
match we draw Φxy from N(0, 1). To have a basis for comparison, we also ran two nonlinear
equation solvers on the system of (X|+ |Y) equations
t2x + tx
(∑
y
exp(Φxy/2)Ty
)
= nx
and
T 2y + Ty
(∑
x
exp(Φxy/2)tx
)
= my,
which characterizes the optimal matching with µxy = exp(Φxy/2)
√
µx0µ0y, µx0 = t
2
x, and
µ0y = T
2
y (see the IPFP formulæ above with ax = by = 0 at the fixed point, or Decker,
Lieb, McCann, and Stephens (2012).)
To solve this system, we used both Minpack and Knitro. Minpack is probably the
most-used solver in scientific applications, and underlies many statistical and numerical
packages. Knitro5 is a constrained optimization software; but minimizing the function zero
under constraints that correspond to the equations one wants to solve has become popular
recently.
5See Byrd, Nocedal, and Waltz (2006).
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For all three methods, we used C/C++ programs, run on a single processor of a Mac
desktop. We set the convergence criterion for the three methods as a relative estimated error
of 10−6. This is not as straightforward as one would like: both Knitro and Minpack rescale
the problem before solving it, while we did not attempt to do it for IPFP. Still, varying
the tolerance within reasonable bounds hardly changes the results, which we present in
Figure 1. Each panel gives the distribution of CPU times over 50 samples (20 for Knitro)
for the ten experiments, in the form of a Tukey box-and-whiskers graph6.
The performance of IPFP stands out clearly—note the different vertical scales. While
IPFP has more variability than Minpack and Knitro (perhaps because we did not rescale
the problem beforehand), even the slowest convergence times for each problem size are at
least three times smaller than the fastest sample under Minpack, and fifteen times smaller
than the fastest time with Knitro. This is all the more remarkable that we fed the code for
the Jacobian of the system of equations into Minpack, and for both the Jacobian and the
Hessian into Knitro.
6 The Linear Choo and Siow Model
Assume that the analyst has chosen K basis surplus vectors
Φ1xy, ...,Φ
K
xy
which are linearly independent: no linear combination of these vectors is identically equal
to zero.
The analyst then specifies the systematic surplus function Φλxy as a linear combination
of these basis surplus vectors, with unknown weights λ ∈ RK :
Φλxy =
K∑
k=1
λkΦ
k
xy (6.1)
6The box goes from the first to the third quartile; the horizontal bar is at the median; the lower (resp.
upper) whisker is at the first (resp. third) quartile minus (resp. plus) 1.5 times the interquartile range, and
the circles plot all points beyond that.
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Figure 1: Solving for the optimal matching
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where the sign of each λk is unrestricted. We call this specification the “linear Choo and
Siow model” because the surplus depends linearly on the parameters. Quite obviously, if
the set of basis surplus vectors is large enough, this specification covers the full set without
restriction; however, parsimony is often valuable in applications.
To return to the education/income example, we could for instance assume that a match
between man i and woman j creates a surplus that depends on whether partners are matched
on both education and income dimensions. The corresponding specification would have basis
functions like 1(Ei = Ej = e) and 1(Ri = Rj = r), along with “one-sided” basis functions
to account for different probabilities of marrying: 1(Ri = r, Ei = e) and 1(Rj = r, Ej = e).
This specification only has (5nR+2) parameters, while an unrestricted specification
7 would
have 4n2R. With more, multi-valued criteria the reduction in dimensionality would be much
larger. It is clear that the relative importance of the λ’s reflects the relative importance
of the criteria. They indicate how large the systematic preference for complementarity of
incomes of partners is relative to the preference for complementarity in educations.
Suppose that the unobserved heterogeneity satisfies Assumption 3. Then the linear
structure underlying model (6.1) makes it very easy to analyze optimal matchings. All
inference can be based on only (K + 1) numbers: the entropy E will be used to test the
specification, and K comoments will be used to estimate λ. Moreover, computing the
Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator of λ becomes very easy.
For any feasible matching µ, we define the comoments
Ck(µ) =
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦ
k
xy.
We prove in Appendix A that
Theorem 4 1. The Maximum Likelihood Estimator is characterized by either of the two
equivalent properties:
7Such an unrestricted specification would for instance allow the effect of matching a man in income class
3 with a woman in income class 2 to also depend on both of their education levels.
28
(a) λˆ maximizes over Λ the concave function
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µˆxyΦ
λ
xy −W (λ) (6.2)
(b) λˆ solves
Ck(µˆ) = Ck(µλ) for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
2. Moreover, the entropy of the optimal matching for the CML cannot be smaller than
the entropy of the observed matching:
E (µˆ) ≤ E
(
µλˆ
)
and the two entropies are equal if and only if µλˆ = µˆ, that is, if and only if the surplus
function in (6.1) rationalizes the observed matching for the CML λˆ.
Therefore under the assumptions that drive the Choo and Siow model, if the surplus
function is linear in the parameters the Conditional Maximum Likelihood maximizes a very
well-behaved (globally concave) function; and it matches the observed comoments to those
that are predicted by the model. Entropy is a sufficient statistic to test the specification;
and if we cannot reject that the model is well-specified (so that the true data-generating
process is of the form (6.1) for the set of basis functions chosen by the analyst), then the
K comoments form a sufficient statistic to estimate λ.
Our approach to inference has a simple geometric interpretation. Consider the set of
comoments associated to every feasible matching
F =
{(
C1, ..., CK
)
: Ck =
∑
xy
µxyΦ
k
xy, µ ∈M (nˆ, mˆ)
}
This is a convex polyhedron, which we call the covariogram; and if the model is well-
specified the covariogram must contain the observed matching µˆ. For any value of the
parameter vector λ, the optimal matching µλ generates a vector of comoments Cλ that
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belongs to the covariogram; and it also has an entropy Eλ ≡ E(µλ). We already know that
this model is just-identified from the comoments: the mapping λ −→ Cλ is invertible on the
covariogram. Denote λ(C) its inverse. The corresponding optimal matching has entropy
Er (C) = Eλ(C).
The level sets of Er (.) are the isoentropy curves in the covariogram; they are represented
on Figure 2. The figure assumes K = 2 dimensions; then λ can be represented in polar
coordinates as λ = r exp(it). For r = 0, the model is uninformative and entropy is highest;
the matching is random and generates comoments C0. At the other extreme, the boundary
∂F of the covariogram corresponds to r = ∞. Then there is no unobserved heterogeneity
and generically over t, the comoments generated by λ must belong to a finite set of vertices,
so that λ is only set-identified.
As r decreases for a given t, the corresponding comoments follow a trajectory indicated
by the dashed line on Figure 2, from the boundary ∂F to the point C0. At the same time,
the entropy Eλ increases, and the trajectory crosses contours of higher entropy (E ′ then E ′′
on the figure.) We prove in Appendix A that the CML Estimator λˆ could also be obtained
by taking the normal to the isoentropy contour that goes through the observed comoments
Cˆ, as shown on Figure 2:
Theorem 5 (Geometric identification and estimation) The estimator λˆ of the pa-
rameter vector is given by the gradient of −Er (.) at the point Cˆ.
Concluding Remarks
While the framework we used here is bipartite, one-to-one matching, our results open the
way to possible extensions to other matching problems. Among these, the “roommate
problem” drops the requirement that the two partners of a match are drawn from distinct
populations. Chiappori, Galichon, and Salanie´ (2012) have shown that this problem is in
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fact isomorphic, in a large population, to an associated bipartite matching problem; as a
consequence, the empirical tools from the present paper can be extended to the study of the
roommate problem. Although an extension to situations of “one-to-many matching” where
one entity on one side of the market (such as a firm) may match with several agents on the
other (such as employees) seems less direct, it is likely that the present approach would be
useful. It may also be insightful in the study of trading on networks, when transfers are
allowed (thus providing an empirical counterpart to Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky,
and Westkamp (2011), Hatfield and Kominers (2012).)
As mentioned earlier, several other approaches to estimating matching models with
heterogeneity exist. One could directly specify the equilibrium utilities of each man and
woman, as Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Ariely (2010) did in a non-transferable utility model.
Under separability, this would amount to choosing a distribution Px and a parameterization
λ of U and fitting the multinomial choice model
max
y∈Y0
(Uxy(λ) + εiy)
to the observed matches of men of type x. The downside is thatunlike the joint surplus, the
utilities U and V are not primitive objects; and it is very difficult to justify a specification
of equilibrium utilities.
An alternative class of approaches pools data from many markets in which the surplus
from a match is assumed to be the same. Fox (2010) starts from the standard monotonicity
property of single-agent choice models, in which under very weak assumptions, the prob-
ability of choosing an alternative increases with its mean utility. By analogy, he posits a
“rank-order property” for matching models with transferable utility: given the character-
istics of the populations of men and women, a given matching is more likely than another
when it produces a higher expected surplus.
Unlike the results we derived from the Choo and Siow (2006) framework, the rank-
order property is not implied by any theoretical model we know of. In our framework, it
holds only when the generalized entropy is a constant function, that is when there is no
matching on unobservable characteristics. The attraction of the identification results based
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on the rank-order property, on the other hand, is that they extend easily to models with
many-to-one or many-to-many matching.
Finally, Fox and Yang (2012) take an approach that is somewhat dual to ours: while we
use separability to restrict the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity so we can focus on
the surplus over observables, they restrict the latter in order to recover the distribution of
complementarities acroos unobservables. To do this, they rely on pooling data across many
markets; in fact given the very high dimensionality of unobservable shocks, their method,
while very ingenious, has yet to be tested on real data.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
(i) By the classical dual formulation of the matching problem, the market equilibrium assigns
utilities uxi to man i such that xi = x and vyj to woman j such that yj = j so as to solve
W = min
∑
i
u˜i +
∑
j
v˜j

where the minimum is taken under the set of constraints
u˜i + v˜j ≥ Φxy + εiy + ηxj , u˜i ≥ ε0i , v˜j ≥ η0j .
Denote
Uxy = min
i:xi=x
{u˜i − εiy} , x ∈ X , y ∈ Y0
Vxy = min
j:yj=y
{
v˜j − ηxj
}
, x ∈ X0, y ∈ Y
so that
u˜i = max
y∈Y0
{Uxiy + εiy} and v˜j = max
x∈X0
{
Vxyj + ηxj
}
Then
W = min
∑
i
max
y∈Y0
{Uxiy + εiy}+
∑
j
max
x∈X0
{
Vxyj + ηxj
}
under the set of constraints
Uxy + Vxy ≥ Φxy , Ux0 ≥ 0 , V0y ≥ 0.
Assign non-negative multipliers µxy, µx0, µ0y to these constraints. By duality in Linear
37
Programming, we can rewrite
W = max
µxy≥0
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy −max
Uxy

∑
x∈X
y∈Y0
µxyUxy −
∑
i
max
y∈Y0
{Uxiy + εiy}

−max
Vxy

∑
x∈X0
y∈Y
µxyVxy −
∑
j
max
x∈X0
{
Vxyj + ηxj
}
 .
Now,
∑
i
max
y∈Y0
{Uxiy + εiy} =
∑
x
nxEPx max
y∈Y0
{Uxiy + εiy} = nxGx(Ux·),
where EPx denotes the expectation over the population of men in group x, and where we
have invoked Assumption 1 and the law of large numbers in order to replace the sum by an
expectation. Adding the similar expression for women, we get
W = max
(µxy)
∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy −A (µ)−B (µ)

where
A (µ) = max
(Uxy)

∑
x∈X
y∈Y0
µxyUxy −
∑
x∈X
nxGx(Ux·)

B (µ) = max
(Vxy)

∑
x∈X0
y∈Y
µxyVxy −
∑
y∈Y
myHy(V·y)

Consider the term with first subscript x in A(µ). It is
∑
y∈Y0
µxyUxy − nxGx(Ux·).
It is easy to see that since Gx is the expected maximum utility, for any number t we have
Gx(Ux· + t) = Gx(Ux·) + t; therefore if
∑
y∈Y0 µxy 6= nx, the term is plus infinity. This
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implies that at the maximum in W, the feasibility constraints in (1.2) must hold, and we
can rewrite A(µ) and B(µ) in terms of the rescaled Legendre-Fenchel transforms:
A (µ) =
∑
x∈X
G∗x (µx·) and B (µ) =
∑
y∈Y
H∗y
(
µ·y
)
.
It follows that
W = max
µ∈M(n,m)

∑
x∈X
y∈Y
µxyΦxy −
∑
x∈X
G∗x (µx·)−
∑
y∈Y
H∗y
(
µ·y
) .
Assigning multipliers ax and by to the feasibility constraints, the first order conditions
of this problem are
Φxy + ax + by =
∂G∗x
∂µxy
(µx·) +
∂H∗y
∂µxy
(µ·y)
and
ax =
∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·), by =
∂H∗y
∂µ0y
(µ·y).
Combining them gives formula (2.8).
(ii) From the proof of part (i), by the envelope theorem
Uxy =
∂A
∂µxy
(µ);
and since
A (µ) =
∑
x∈X
G∗x (µx·) ,
adding the normalization Ux0 = 0 gives the formula for Uxy in the theorem.
(iii) By duality, ux = Gx(Ux·) is the multiplier of the feasibility constraint for group x;
and the proof of (i) shows that this is
ax =
∂G∗x
∂µx0
(µx·).
The proof of (iv) is the same as for (ii) and (iii).
(v) follows from the fact that Uxy = αxy + τxy and Vxy = γxy − τxy; thus if Uxy and Vxy
are identified and τxy is observed, then α and γ are identified by
αxy = Uxy − τxy and γxy = Vxy + τxy.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By definition,
Gx(Ux·) = EPx
(
max
y∈Y0
(Uxy + εiy)
)
and
G∗x(µx·) = max
U˜x·=(U˜x0,...,U˜x|Y|)
∑
y∈Y0
µxyU˜xy −
∑
y∈Y0
µxy
Gx(U˜x·)
 .
Now, using the feasibility constraint
∑
y∈Y0 µxy = nx :
G∗x(µx·) = −nx min
U˜x·
EPx (max
y∈Y0
(
U˜xy + εiy
))
−
∑
y∈Y0
µxy
nx
U˜xy
 ,
and defining U¯xy = −U˜xy, this is also
G∗x(µx·) = −nx min
U¯x·
∑
y∈Y0
µxy
nx
U¯xy + EPx
(
max
y∈Y0
(
εiy − U¯xy
))
The first term in the minimand is the expectation of U¯x· under the distribution µY |X=x;
therefore this can be rewritten as
G∗x(µx·) = −nx min
U¯xy+kx(εi·)≥εiy
(
EµY |X=xU¯xY + EPxkx(εi·)
)
where the minimum is taken over all pairs of functions (U¯x·, kx(εi·) that satisfy the inequal-
ity. We recognize the value of the dual of a matching problem in which the margins are
µY |X=x and Px and the surplus is εiy. By the equivalence of the primal and the dual, this
gives
G∗x(µx·) = −nx max
pi∈Mx
Epi [εiy] .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof uses results in Bauschke and Borwein (1997), which builds on Csisza´r (1975).
For any matching µ, consider the function
ϕ(µ) = −E(µ).
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Since generalized entropy E is concave in µ, ϕ is a convex function. In fact, it satisfies
the conditions in Bauschke and Borwein (1997); in particular it is a Legendre function8.
Introduce D the associated “Bregman divergence” as
D (µ; ν) = ϕ (µ)− ϕ (ν)− 〈∇ϕ (ν) , µ− ν〉 .
Bregman divergences are often called “Bregman distances”; they are not distances, but
they are useful for our purposes because one can generalize the concept of a projection to
Bregman divergences.
Now take any surplus function Φ and margins nˆ amd mˆ. Step 1 of the algorithm
constructs a matching µ(0) such that for all x 6= 0, y 6= 0
Φxy =
∂ϕ
∂µxy
(µ(0))− ∂ϕ
∂µx0
(µ(0))− ∂ϕ
∂µ0y
(µ(0))
and 2
∑
xy µ
(0)
xy +
∑
x µ
(0)
x0 +
∑
y µ
(0)
0y =
∑
x nˆx +
∑
y mˆy. Note that while µ
(0) adds up to the
total number of men and women, it needn’t satisfy any of the other feasibility constraints.
Moreover, by Theorem 2, the optimal matching for Φ given margins n and m (which always
exists) satisfies all of these constraints; therefore we can always find such a µ(0).
Then〈
∇ϕ(µ(0)), µ− µ(0)
〉
=
∑
xy
∂ϕ
∂µxy
(µ(0))(µxy−µ(0)xy )+
∑
x
∂ϕ
∂µx0
(µ(0))(µx0−µ(0)x0 )+
∑
y
∂ϕ
∂µ0y
(µ(0))(µ0y−µ(0)0y )
becomes
∑
xy
µxyΦxy +
∑
x
∂ϕ
∂µx0
(µ(0))
(∑
y
µxy + µx0
)
+
∑
y
∂ϕ
∂µ0y
(µ(0))
(∑
x
µxy + µ0y
)
,
up to additive terms that depend on µ(0) but not on µ. But if µ ∈M(nˆ, mˆ), then ∑y µxy +
µx0 = nˆx and
∑
x µxy + µ0y = mˆy, so that up to irrelevant terms,〈
∇ϕ(µ(0)), µ− µ(0)
〉
=
∑
xy
µxyΦxy
8A Legendre function is essentially smooth and essentially strictly convex—see section 2 of Bauschke and
Borwein (1997) for details.
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and
D(µ, µ(0)) = ϕ(µ) +
∑
xy
µxyΦxy =
∑
xy
µxyΦxy − E(µ)
on M(nˆ, mˆ).
Since the optimal matching for surplus Φ and margins nˆ and mˆ maximizes
∑
xy
µxyΦxy + E(µ)
it can also be found by minimizing D(µ, µ(0)) over µ ∈M(nˆ, mˆ); that is, by projecting µ(0)
on M(nˆ, mˆ) using the Bregman divergence.
Introduce the linear subspaces M (nˆ) and M (mˆ) by
M (nˆ) =
µ ≥ 0 : ∀x ∈ X , ∑
y∈Y
µxy + µx0 = nˆx

M (mˆ) =
{
µ ≥ 0 : ∀y ∈ Y,
∑
x∈X
µxy + µ0y = mˆy
}
so that
M(nˆ, mˆ) =M (nˆ) ∩M (mˆ) .
We define µ(k) recursively by iteratively projecting with respect to D on the linear
subspaces M(nˆ) and on M(mˆ):
µ(2k+1) = arg min
µ∈M(nˆ)
D
(
µ;µ(2k)
)
(A.1)
µ(2k+2) = arg min
µ∈M(mˆ)
D
(
µ;µ(2k+1)
)
(A.2)
By Theorem 8.4 of Bauschke and Borwein (1997), the iterated projection algorithm
converges9 to the projection µ of µ(0) on M(nˆ, mˆ), which is also the maximizer µ of (2.7).
9In the notation of their Theorem 8.4, the hyperplanes (Ci) are M(p) and M(q); and the Breg-
man/Legendre function f is our φ.
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The updating formulas of the Theorem are easily obtained; let us work out (A.1).
Introduce multipliers ax for the feasibility constraints µ
(2k+1) ∈M(nˆ). Neglecting irrelevant
terms again, the Bregman divergence is
D(µ, µ(2k)) = ϕ(µ)−
∑
xy
∂ϕ
∂µxy
(µ(2k))µxy −
∑
x
∂ϕ
∂µx0
(µ(2k))µx0 −
∑
y
∂ϕ
∂µ0y
(µ(2k))µ0y
and the constraints are
∑
y µxy + µx0 = nˆx for all x.
The first order conditions are simply
∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k+1))− ∂E
∂µxy
(µ(2k)) = ax for x ∈ X , y ∈ Y0
∂E
∂µ0y
(µ(2k+1))− ∂E
∂µ0y
(µ(2k)) = 0 for y ∈ Y.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Since W is 1-homogeneous in (nˆ, mˆ, µ),
W =
∑
x
nˆx
∂W
∂nx
+
∑
y
mˆy
∂W
∂my
.
Therefore
∂W
∂λ
=
∑
x
nˆx
∂2W
∂nx∂λ
+
∑
y
mˆy
∂2W
∂my∂λ
.
Now by (iii) of Theorem 2,
∂W
∂nx
= ux = − log µ
λ
x0
nˆx
hence
∂2W
∂nx∂λ
= −∂ logµ
λ
x0
∂λ
.
Therefore
∂W
∂λ
= −
∑
x
nˆx
∂ logµλx0
∂λ
−
∑
y
mˆy
∂ logµλ0y
∂λ
. (A.3)
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Now consider the derivative of the log-likelihood:
∂ logL
∂λ
= 2
∑
xy
µˆxy
∂ logµλxy
∂λ
+
∑
x
µˆx0
∂ logµλx0
∂λ
+
∑
y
µˆ0y
∂ logµλ0y
∂λ
.
Since µˆx0 = nˆx −
∑
y µˆxy, we get
∑
y
µˆxy
∂ logµλxy
∂λ
+ µˆx0
∂ logµλx0
∂λ
= nˆx
∂ logµλx0
∂λ
+
∑
y
µˆxy
(
∂ logµλxy
∂λ
− ∂ logµ
λ
x0
∂λ
)
;
adding up with similar terms for women gives
∂ logL
∂λ
=
∑
xy
µˆxy
(
2
∂ logµλxy
∂λ
− ∂ logµ
λ
x0
∂λ
− ∂ logµ
λ
0y
∂λ
)
+
∑
x
nˆx
∂ logµλx0
∂λ
+
∑
y
mˆy
∂ logµλ0y
∂λ
;
or, using (A.3),
∂ logL
∂λ
=
∑
xy
µˆxy
(
2
∂ logµλxy
∂λ
− ∂ logµ
λ
x0
∂λ
− ∂ logµ
λ
0y
∂λ
)
− ∂W
∂λ
.
But given Theorem 1, this is just
∂ logL
∂λ
=
∑
xy
µˆxy
∂Φλxy
∂λ
− ∂W
∂λ
,
which establishes part 1(a) of the Theorem.
Now by the envelope theorem,
∂W
∂λ
=
∑
xy
µλxy
∂Φλxy
∂λ
since the entropy term does not depend on λ in the Choo and Siow model; this proves part
1(b) since with the linear specification
∂Φλxy
∂λk
= Ck(λ).
To prove part 2, note that since µλˆ maximizes W when λ = λˆ,
∑
x,y
µˆxyΦ
λˆ
xy + E (µˆ) ≤
∑
x,y
µλˆxyΦ
λˆ
xy + E
(
µλˆ
)
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and, since E is strictly concave in µ, equality holds if and only if µλˆ = µˆ. But
∑
x,y
µˆxyΦ
λˆ
xy =
∑
x,y
µλˆxyΦ
λˆ
xy
by construction, hence
E (µˆ) ≤ E
(
µλˆ
)
with equality if and only if µλˆ = µˆ.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Let us first prove that
Er
(
Cˆ
)
= min
λ
(
W (λ)−
K∑
k=1
λkCˆ
k
)
. (A.4)
Indeed, the optimum is reached at λˆ = λ
(
Cˆ
)
, and there
Er
(
Cˆ
)
=W
(
λˆ
)
−
K∑
k=1
λˆkCˆ
k = E
(
µλˆ
)
which shows (A.4). This implies that Er
(
Cˆ
)
is a concave function; and by the envelope
theorem in (A.4), we get
∂Er
∂Ck
(
Cˆ
)
= λˆ
k
.
B The Generalized Extreme Values Framework
Consider a family of functions gx : R|Y|+1 → R such that the following four conditions hold:
(i) gx are positive homogeneous of degree one; (ii) they go to +∞ whenever any of their
arguments goes to +∞ (iii) their partial derivatives of order k exist outside of 0 and have
sign (−1)k (iv) and the functions defined by
Px (w0, ..., wJ) = exp
(−gx (e−w0 , ..., e−wJ ))
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are multivariate cumulative distribution functions. Then introducing utility shocks εx ∼ Px,
we have by a theorem of McFadden (1978):
Gx(w)
nx
= EPx
[
max
y∈Y0
{wy + εy}
]
= log gx (e
w) + γ
where γ is the Euler constant γ ' 0.577. Therefore, if ∑y∈Y0 ay = nx, then
G∗x (nx, a) =
∑
y∈Y0
ayw
x
y (nx, a)− nx
(
log gx
(
ew
x(nx,a)
)
+ γ
)
where for x ∈ X0, the vector wx (nx, a) solves the system
ay = nx
∂
∂wxy
log gx
(
ew
x)
, y ∈ Y0. (B.1)
Hence, the part of the expression of E(n,m, µ) arising from the heterogeneity on the
men side is ∑
x∈X
nx log gx (ewx(nx,µx·))−∑
y∈Y0
µxyw
x
y (nx,µx·)
+ C
where C = γ
∑
x∈X nx, whose derivative with respect to µxy (x, y ≥ 1) is −wxy (nx,µx·).
C Computations for the Examples
C.1 Computations for Example 1
With type I extreme values iid distributions, the expected utility is
Gx(Ux·) = log
∑
y∈Y0
exp(Uxy),
and the maximum in the program that defines G∗x(µx·) is achieved in
Uxy = Ux0 + log
µxy
µx0
.
This yields
G∗x(µx·) =
∑
y∈Y0
µxy logµxy −
∑
y∈Y0
 log
∑
y∈Y0

which gives equation (3.1). Equation (3.2) obtains by straightforward differentiation.
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C.2 Computations for Example 2
Consider a man of a group x. Such a man marries a woman of education e′ within social
group g′ with conditional probability
µx,g′e′
µx,g′
=
exp(Ux,g′e′/σx,g′)∑L
e′=1 exp(Ux,g′e′/σx,g′)
;
and his probability of marrying within group g′ is
µx,g′
nx
=
(∑L
e′=1 exp(Ux,g′e′/σx,g′)
)σx,g′
1 +
∑G
g′′=1
(∑L
e′=1 exp(Ux,g′′e′/σx,g′′)
)σx,g′′ .
Then, taking logs and subtracting,
Ux,g′e′ = σx,g′ log
µx,g′e′
µx,g′
+ tx,g′
so that only the constants tx,g′ remain to be determined by solving (with Ux0 = 0 as usual)
µx,g′
nx
=
exp(tx,g′)
1 +
∑G
g′′=1 exp(tx,g′′)
.
This gives exp(tx,g′) =
µx,g′
µx,0
, so that
Ux,g′e′ = log
µx,g′
µx,0
+ σx,g′ log
µx,g′e′
µx,g′
.
The expected utility of this man is
ux = log
1 + G∑
g=1
σx,g′ log
(
L∑
e′=1
exp(Ux,g′e′/σx,g′)
)
which is
u = log
1 + G∑
g=1
µx,g′
µx,0
L∑
e′=1
(
µx,g′e′
µx,g′
)σx,g′ .
Finally, the formula for Ux,ge shows that the surplus from a marriage between a man (g, e)
and a woman (g′, e′) is identified by the formula in the text.
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C.3 Computations for Example 3
We start by giving a formula for G∗x in the slightly more general case where ε is continuously
distributed according to a c.d.f. Fε. From Proposition 2,
G∗x(µx·) = −nx max
pi∈Mx
Epi [φx (Y ) ε] .
where pi has margins Fε and µ(Y |X = x). Since the function (ε, φ) −→ εφ is supermodu-
lar, the optimal matching must exhibit positive assortative matching—larger ε’s must be
matched with y’s with larger values of the index φx(y). Let
φ(1) < . . . < φ(m)
denote the distinct values that the index takes over Y0; value φ(k) has probability
Pr(φx(Y ) = φ(k)|X = x) =
∑
φx(y)=φ(k)
µxy
nx
. (C.1)
By positive assortative matching, there exists a sequence
ε(0) = inf ε < ε(1) < . . . < ε(m−1)ε(m) = sup ε
such that ε matches with an y with φx(y) = φ(k) if and only if ε ∈ [ε(k−1), ε(k)]; and since
probability is conserved, the sequence is constructed recursively by
Fε
(
ε(k)
)− Fε (ε(k−1)) =
∑
φx(y)=φ(k)
µxy
nx
. (C.2)
The resulting surplus is
m∑
k=1
φ(k)E
(
ε1(ε ∈ [ε(k−1), ε(k)])
)
.
Now assume that ε is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Then (C.2) gives
ε(k) =
∑
φx(y)≤φ(k) µxy
nx
= Pr
(
φx(Y ) ≤ φ(k)|X = x
)
,
and
E
(
ε1(ε ∈ [ε(k−1), ε(k)])
)
=
ε2(k) − ε2(k−1)
2
,
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which is alsoPr(φx(Y ) ≤ φ(k)|X = x)− Pr
(
φx(Y ) ≤ φ(k)|X = x
)
2
Pr(φx(Y ) = φ(k)|X = x) .
Therefore G∗x(µx·) is
−
m∑
k=1
∑
y|φx(y)=φ(k)
φ(k)
Pr(φx(Y ) ≤ φ(k)|X = x)− Pr
(
φx(Y ) ≤ φ(k)|X = x
)
2
Pr(φx(Y ) = φ(k)|X = x) ;
changing the order of sums and using (C.1) turns this into
G∗x(µx·) = −
∑
y∈Y0
µxyφx(y)
∑
φx(y
′)≤φx(y) µxy′ −
∑
φx(y
′)=φx(y)
µxy′/2
nx
.
The derivative in µxy has two terms:
−φx(y)
(∑
φx(y
′)≤φx(y) µxy′ −
∑
φx(y
′)=φx(y)
µxy′/2
nx
)
and
−
∑
y′∈Y0
µxy′φx(y
′)
1(φx(y) ≤ φx(y′))− 1(φx(y) = φx(y′))/2
nx
.
Combining them,
∂G∗x(µx·)
∂µxy
= −
∑
φx(y
′)≤φx(y)
φx(y)
µxy′
nx
−
∑
φx(y)≤φx(y′)
µxy′
nx
φx(y
′) +
∑
φx(y
′)=φx(y)
φx(y)
µxy′
nx
= −
 ∑
φx(y
′)≤φx(y)
φx(y)
µxy′
nx
+
∑
φx(y)<φx(y
′)
µxy′
nx
φx(y
′)

= −E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (y))]
so that
ux = −∂G
∗
x(µx.)
∂µx0
= E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (0))]
and
Uxy =
∂G∗x(µx.)
∂µxy
− ∂G
∗
x(µx.)
∂µx0
= −E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (y))] + E [max (φx (Y ) , φx (0))] .
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